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Abstract
The prevalence of e-commerce has made detailed customers’ personal information readily
accessible to retailers, and this information has been widely used in pricing decisions. When
involving personalized information, how to protect the privacy of such information becomes a
critical issue in practice. In this paper, we consider a dynamic pricing problem over T time
periods with an unknown demand function of posted price and personalized information. At
each time t, the retailer observes an arriving customer’s personal information and offers a price.
The customer then makes the purchase decision, which will be utilized by the retailer to learn
the underlying demand function. There is potentially a serious privacy concern during this
process: a third party agent might infer the personalized information and purchase decisions
from price changes from the pricing system. Using the fundamental framework of differential
privacy from computer science, we develop a privacy-preserving dynamic pricing policy, which
tries to maximize the retailer revenue while avoiding information leakage of individual customer’s
information and purchasing decisions. To this end, we first introduce a notion of anticipating
(ε, δ)-differential privacy that is tailored to dynamic pricing problem. Our policy achieves both
the privacy guarantee and the performance guarantee in terms of regret. Roughly speaking,
for d-dimensional personalized information, our algorithm achieves the expected regret at the
order of O˜(ε−1
√
d3T ), when the customers’ information is adversarially chosen. For stochastic
personalized information, the regret bound can be further improved to O˜(
√
d2T + ε−2d2).
1 Introduction
The increasing prominence of e-commerce has given retailers an unprecedented power to un-
derstand their customers as individuals and to tailor their services accordingly. For example,
∗Author names listed in alphabetical order
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personal information has known to be used in pricing on traveling websites (Hannak et al. 2014)
and Amazon (Chen et al. 2016); Linden et al. (2003) illustrate how the personal information
was used in Amazon recommender systems to achieve a dramatic increase in click-through and
conversion rates. Although the availability of personal data (e.g., location, web search histories,
media consumption, social media actives) enables better services for an individual customer,
it poses significant privacy issues in practice (e.g., Apple Differential Privacy Team (2017)).
Many existing privacy protection approaches are rather ad-hoc by “anonymizing” personal in-
formation. However, such ad-hoc anonymization leads to two issues. First, it is difficult to
quantify the level of privacy. Second, it has been shown that a de-anonymization procedure
can easily jeopardize privacy. Examples include the de-anonymization of released AOL search
logs (Barbaro & Zeller 2006) and movie watching records in Netflix challenge (Narayanan &
Shmatikov 2008). Therefore, personalized operations management urgently calls for mathemat-
ically rigorous privacy-preserving methods to prevent personal information leakage in online
decision-making. On the one hand, personalized revenue management has received a significant
amount of attention in recent operations literature (see, e.g., Ban & Keskin (2017), Cheung &
Simchi-Levi (2017) and references therein). On the other hand, how to protect an individual’s
privacy has not been well-explored in the existing literature.
In this paper, we study how to systematically protect individual’s privacy in the dynamic
pricing problem with demand learning. Given T time periods, a potential customer arrives at
each time t, and the retailer will receives xt containing information about the incoming customer,
such as his/her age, location, prior purchases and ratings, credit scores, etc. We consider a very
general personalized setting, where the customers are heterogeneous and thus the feature {xt}Tt=1
do not necessarily follow the same distribution. By observing the personal information xt, the
retailer offers the customer a price pt ∈ [0, 1]. The customer then makes yt ∈ R, where the
random demand yt follows a generalized linear model of a feature vector φ(xt, pt) ∈ Rd (see (1))
and the retailer collects revenue ptyt. The objective of the retailer is to maximize her expected
revenue over the entire T time periods, or more specifically E[
∑T
t=1 ptyt]. As the main focus of
the paper is on how to product individual’s sensitive information, we consider a stylized setting
of pricing a single product, with unlimited inventories available.
Due to the personalized nature, much sensitive information is involved during the aforemen-
tioned pricing procedure, such as the customers’ personal information characterized by xt and
their actual purchase activities by yt (e.g., whether a purchase was made at time t). Thanks to
secured internet communication channels, the information (xt, pt, yt) at time t is usually securely
transmitted, and thus only revealed to the retailer and the particular customer coming at time
t. However, though the information at time t is not directly accessible to future customers, the
sensitive information is not completely shielded from outside third party agents (a.k.a. attack-
ers or adversaries) because of the ripple effects of historical customers’ data on future pricing
decisions of a data-driven pricing system. Indeed, a third-party agent who observes his own
posted prices in the future can potentially infer an individual’s personal information xt and her
purchase decision yt. Below we give two examples showing how the sensitive data at time t
could be potentially breached and why such privacy leakage could incur serious challenges to
the integrity of the underlying pricing system.
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Leakage of purchase activity yt. For sensitive commodities such as medications, cus-
tomers’ purchasing decisions {yt} must be well protected from the public as such purchases
potentially reveal purchasers’ underlying medical conditions. Some dynamic pricing policies
would increase prices facing increased sales volumes for a higher profit. Such behavior might
inadvertently leak information about yt to a third party via the fluctuation of prices. For ex-
ample, a third-party agent might place orders immediately before and after a person of interest
and if he sees a slight spike in his received prices, he might be able to infer the purchase decision
yt of the person of interest.
Leakage of customer’s personal information xt. When making the price decision pt
to an arriving customer at time t, the retailer makes use of the customer’s personal information
xt. Some components of xt, such as the customer’s age, credit history, and prior purchases, are
highly sensitive and should be protected. Consider a natural pricing policy that is highly “local”
to personal information, e.g., posting similar prices to future customers with a similar profile
as the customer t. A third-party agent could arrive before and after a person of interest with
guesses of personal information to detect whether there are noticeable changes in the prices.
Then, the agent would be able to infer to some degree personal information xt of the individual
of interest.
In summary, it is vital to develop systematic and mathematically rigorous policies that
provably protect customers’ privacy. As we discussed before, simple data anonymization lacks
a theoretical foundation and can be jeopardized. On the other hand, the notion of differential
privacy (DP), which was proposed in the computer science field (Dwork et al. 2006a,b), has laid
a solid foundation for private data analysis and achieved great success in industries. The DP
is not only a gold standard notion in academia but also has been widely adopted in industries,
such as Apple (Apple Differential Privacy Team 2017), Google (Erlingsson et al. 2014), Microsoft
(Ding et al. 2017), and US Census Bureau (Abowd 2018). The aim of this paper is therefore
to build upon the differential privacy notion to design mathematically rigorous private policies
with provable utility (regret) guarantees for the dynamic personalized pricing problem.
1.1 Our contributions
The major contributions of this paper can be best summarized as follows:
Near-optimal regret of provably private pricing policies. Built upon the notion of
anticipating differential privacy, we propose a privacy-aware personalized pricing algorithm that
enjoys rigorous regret guarantees. More specifically, in a general setting when the personalized
information of each coming customers can be adversarially chosen, our policy achieves a regret
upper bound of O˜(ε−1
√
d3T ), where ε is the parameter in DP (a smaller ε implies a stronger
privacy preservation of the resulting algorithm), d is the dimension of the feature map φ(xt, pt),
T is the time horizon, and O˜(·) hides logarithmic factors (see Theorem 1). The √T dependency
on the time horizon T in this regret upper bound is optimal.
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In addition to the regret upper bound for the general personalized information setting, we
also study a “stochastic” setting in which the customers’ personal information {xt} is assumed to
be stochastic and independently and identically distributed from an unknown non-degenerate
distribution. We remark that this is a common assumption/setting studied in the existing
literature (Qiang & Bayati 2016, Miao et al. 2019). In this setting, with some changes of hyper-
parameters of our proposed algorithm, an improved regret upper bound of O˜(d
√
T + ε−2d2)
can be proved (see Theorem 2). One attractive property of this bound is that it separates the
dependency on conventional problem parameters (i.e., d and T ) and that on privacy related
parameter (i.e., ε). The dominating term (with T → ∞) in this regret bound, namely the
O˜(d
√
T ) term, is optimal in both d and T , as shown in (Dani et al. 2008).
Technical contributions. Our proposed framework for privacy-preserving personalized
dynamic pricing makes use of several existing privacy-aware learning/releasing techniques, such
as the AnalyzeGauss method in online PCAs (Dwork et al. 2014), the tree-based aggregation
technique for releasing serial data (Chan et al. 2011) and differentially private empirical risk
minimization methods (Kifer et al. 2012, Chaudhuri et al. 2011). On the other hand, the
development and analysis of our proposed method make several key technical contributions to
the general topic of privacy-aware sequential decision making in revenue management problems,
which we briefly summarize as follows:
1. One salient feature of this paper is the inclusion of customers’ personal information xt as
sensitive data whose privacy needs to be protected, which is different from existing works
(Tang et al. 2020), where only purchase activities yt are regarded as sensitive data (see Sec-
tion 2 for more discussions). The objective of protecting privacy in {xt} has two technical
challenges. First, as {xt} and subsequently the feature representations {φt} are sensitive
data, one cannot directly apply the private follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) approach
in (Tang et al. 2020) to the dynamic pricing problem. Furthermore, the sensitivity of {xt}
implies the sensitivity of {pt} as well, since prices offered to incoming customers must be
strongly associated with the customers’ personal information to achieve good revenue per-
formances. To address challenge, we build our DP setting on the notion of anticipating DP
(Shariff & Sheffet 2018), which excludes prices in prior selling periods from the outcome
sets of a randomized algorithm.
2. The demand rate function f as a function of price p and personal information x is modeled
in this paper as a generalized linear model within the exponential family. Despite its
apparent similarity as linear models, such generalization results in significant challenges
when privacy concerns are considered. In fact, this is still an open problem for generalized
linear contextual bandit under the DP guarantee. More specifically, the results of Shariff
& Sheffet (2018) on privacy-aware linear bandits rely heavily on the fact that the ordinary
least squares solution is in a closed-form with two simple sufficient statistics: the sample
covariance matrix X>X and the response-weighted feature vector X>y. With the post-
processing property of DP (which we briefly discuss in Sec. 4.1.2), it suffices to obtain
privacy-preserved copies of X>X and X>y at each time. In contrast, parameter estimates
in generalized linear models are usually obtained using maximum likelihood estimates
4
(MLE), which do not have simple sufficient statistics. It is nearly impossible to guarantee
the privacy and a non-trivial regret simultaneously if the MLE is updated at every period.
To overcome this challenge, we make the important observation that the number required
updates of MLEs can be reduced significantly (i.e., only O(d log T ) periods of updates will
be sufficient). This key observation allows us to compose differentially private empirical
risk minimizers (Kifer et al. 2012) to arrive at a privacy-aware contextual bandit algorithm
even without explicit sufficient statistics.
3. The generalized linear model for demand rate modeling resembles existing works on para-
metric contextual bandits without privacy constraints (Li et al. 2017, Filippi et al. 2010,
Wang et al. 2019). One significant limitation of these existing works is that, without as-
suming stochasticity of the contextual vectors, the optimization of parameter estimates in
these works is usually non-convex. Examples include the robustified Z-estimation in (Fil-
ippi et al. 2010) and the constrained least-squares formulation in (Wang et al. 2019), both
of which are non-convex for some popular generalized linear models such as the logistic
regression model. While such non-convexity poses only computational difficulties in non-
private bandit, these challenges become much more significant when privacy constraints
are imposed since most existing techniques of DP stochastic optimization requires convex-
ity (Kifer et al. 2012, Chaudhuri et al. 2011) and the general privacy-aware non-convex
optimization is extremely difficult.
To overcome this challenge, this paper analyzes a constrained maximum likelihood es-
timation in a more refined style with a relatively large regularization parameter, and
demonstrates that with high probability, the solution to the constrained MLE lies in the
strict interior of the constraint set (Lemma 2). This result then implies the first-order
KKT condition of the solution, from which the Z-estimation analysis in (Li et al. 2017,
Filippi et al. 2010) can be used together with the analysis of an objective-perturbed convex
minimization problem to obtain satisfactory regret upper bounds.
1.2 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature in
both dynamic pricing and differential privacy. We setup our pricing models and formalize
the anticipating DP in Section 3. Our policy is presented in Section 4, which contains two
components: privacy releasers and price optimizers. Sections 5 and 6 establish the privacy and
regret guarantees, respectively, followed by a conclusion in Section 8.
2 Literature Review
This section briefly reviews some related research from both the personalized pricing and differ-
ential privacy literature.
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Personalized dynamic pricing with demand learning. Due to the increasing pop-
ularity of online retailing, dynamic pricing with demand learning has become an active research
area in revenue management in the past ten years (see, e.g., Araman & Caldentey (2009), Besbes
& Zeevi (2009), Farias & Van Roy (2010), Harrison et al. (2012), Broder & Rusmevichientong
(2012), den Boer & Zwart (2013), Wang et al. (2014), Chen et al. (2015), Besbes & Zeevi (2015),
Cheung et al. (2017), Ferreira et al. (2018)). More recently, due to the availability of abundant
personal information, personalized pricing with feature information has been investigated in
several works. For example, Chen et al. (2020) studied offline personalized pricing and quanti-
fied the statistical property of the MLE. Cohen et al. (2016) considered a binary thresholding
model for purchasing decisions by comparing a linear function of the feature and the posted
price, proposed an ellipsoid-based method for dynamic pricing, and established the worst-case
regret bound. Qiang & Bayati (2016) considered a linear demand model and studied the perfor-
mance of the greedy iterated least squares. Ban & Keskin (2017) and Javanmard & Nazerzadeh
(2019) studied personalized dynamic pricing problem in high-dimensional settings with sparsity
assumption of features. A very recent work by Tang et al. (2020) studied differentially-private
contextual dynamic pricing and proposed a Follow-the Approximate-Leader-type policy. Our
work is different from this paper in several aspects. First, we protect the personal information
{xt}, while Tang et al. (2020) treated this information as public. Second, Tang et al. (2020)
adopted the classical DP notion, while we consider the notion of anticipating DP. Finally, we
assume that the demand follows a generalized linear model of a feature map of personal infor-
mation and price, while Tang et al. (2020) considered a binary thresholding purchase model
with a linear mapping of contextual information.
Differential privacy for online learning. Since the notation of (ε, δ)-differential (DP)
privacy was proposed by Dwork et al. (2006a,b), it becomes a golden standard for private-
preserving data analysis in both academia and industry. Please refer to the survey Dwork &
Roth (2014) for a comprehensive introduction of DP.
Built on the classical notion, other privacy notions have also been developed in the literature,
such as Gaussian DP (Dong et al. 2019), joint DP (Shariff & Sheffet 2018), local DP (Elmaghraby
& Keskinocak 2003), average-KL DP (Wang et al. 2016), per-instance DP (Wang 2019). Our
notion of anticipating DP is motivated by the joint DP (Shariff & Sheffet 2018) designed for
linear contextual bandit. While the work of Shariff & Sheffet (2018) studied the linear contextual
bandit subject to differential privacy constraints, their methods and analysis are built upon the
noisy perturbation of sufficient statistics (namely, the sample covariance and sample average).
Thus, their method is not applicable to the personalized pricing question, where generalized
linear demand models are widely used (see also the technical challenges summarized in the
introduction).
In DP, there are several fundamental techniques, such as composition, post-processing (see
Section 4.1 and Dwork & Roth (2014)), partial-sum by tree-based aggregation Dwork et al.
(2010), Chan et al. (2011), and “objective-perturbation” (Chaudhuri et al. 2011, Kifer et al.
2012).
The techniques of DP have been applied to multi-armed bandit problems. For example,
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Mishra & Thakurta (2015) developed differentially private UCB and Thompson sampling algo-
rithms for classical bandits. Neel & Roth (2018) and Shariff & Sheffet (2018) further studied
differentially private linear contextual bandit, where Mishra & Thakurta (2015) protected the
privacy of rewards and Shariff & Sheffet (2018) protected both rewards and contextual infor-
mation. However, for linear bandits, since the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) admits a
simple closed-form solution, one only needs to protect the sufficient statistics (e.g.,
∑t
t′=1 xt′x
>
t′
and
∑t
t′=1 yt′xt′). On the other hand, we consider a much more general demand model following
a generalized linear model. Therefore, the corresponding MLE does not admit a closed-form so-
lution; and we address this challenge by providing a new analysis of constrained MLE properties.
There are other interesting private online learning frameworks developed in recent literature.
For example, The private sequential learning model was proposed in Tsitsiklis et al. (2020)
(for noiseless responses) and further investigated in Xu (2018) and Xu et al. (2020) (for noisy
responses). In particular, Xu et al. (2020) quantified the optimal query complexity for private
sequential learning against eavesdropping. While existing privacy literature mainly focuses on
protecting data owner’s privacy, this work investigates how to protect a learner’s privacy, who
sequentially queries a database and receives binary responses. We note that the goal of the pri-
vate sequential learning is to learn a global parameter, e.g., “the highest price to charge so that
at least 50% of the consumers would purchase” in pricing domain (Xu et al. 2020), and to make
sure the adversary cannot infer the final release price. In contrast, our goal is to make sequential
decision-making to maximize revenue while protecting individuals’ personalized information and
purchasing decisions.
3 Pricing Models and Privacy Formulations
In this section, we give rigorous mathematical formulations of the dynamic personalized pricing
problem and privacy preservation guarantees.
3.1 Dynamic pricing with personalized information
The basic setting of personalized dynamic pricing has been described in the introduction. In
this section, we provide more technical details of the problem setting. At each time t with the
observed personal information xt and the posted price pt, the (random) demand realized by
customer at time t is modeled by a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) within the exponential
family, taking the form of
Pr[yt = y|pt, xt, θ∗] = exp{ζ(yφ>t θ∗ −m(φ>t θ∗)) + h(y)}, (1)
where φt = φ(xt, pt) ∈ Rd is a known feature map, θ∗ ∈ Rd is an unknown linear model, and
ζ,m(·), h(·) are components of the distribution family. Some examples of exponential family
distributions including the Gaussian distribution and the Logistic model, which are given at
the end of this section. It is easy to verify that f(φ>t θ
∗) := m′(φ>t θ
∗) is the expectation of yt
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conditioned on pt, xt and θ
∗. Hence, we can equivalently write Eq. (1) as
yt = f(φ
>
t θ
∗) + ξt, (2)
where φt = φ(xt, pt) and ξt are independent random variables satisfying E[ξt|pt, xt] = 0.
We next specify the filtration process of xt and pt. Let Ft = {(xτ , yτ , pτ )}tτ=1 be the history
up to time period t. In the most general setting, the features {xt}Tt=1 of the T customers are
arbitrarily chosen before the pricing process starts 1. The price pt at each time t is subsequently
chosen by the dynamic pricing policy conditioned on filtration Ft−1 and xt. The demand yt is
then realized via yt = f(φ
>
t θ
∗) + ξt, where φt = φ(xt, pt) and E[ξt|xt, pt,Ft−1] = 0.
Throughout this paper we impose the following conditions on the distribution family, the
linear model and the feature map:
1. Both the feature vectors and the linear model have at most unit norm, or more specifically
‖φ(x, p)‖2, ‖θ∗‖2 ≤ 1 for all x, p;
2. The stochastic noises {ξt} are centered and sub-Gaussian, meaning that E[ξt|xt, pt,Ft−1] =
0 and there exists s <∞ such that E[eλξt |xt, pt,Ft−1] ≤ eλ2s2/2 for all λ ∈ R;
3. f(·) = m′(·) maps R to [0, 1], is continuously differentiable and strictly monotonically
increasing. Furthermore, for all |z| ≤ 2, K−1 ≤ f ′(z) ≤ K for some constant 1 ≤ K <∞;
4. ζ in Eq. (1) satisfies G−1 ≤ ζ ≤ G for some constant 1 ≤ G <∞.
Below we give some common examples that fall into Eq. (1) and satisfy all imposed condi-
tions.
Example 1 (Gaussian model). In the Gaussian model the realized demand yt follows yt =
φ>t θ
∗ + ξt with ξt ∼ N (0, 1). It is easy to verify that the Gaussian model falls into Eq. (2) with
ζ = 1, m(z) = 12z
2, f(z) = m′(z) = z and h(y) = − 12y2 − 12 ln(2pi). The Gaussian model also
satisfies all imposed conditions with s = 1, K = 1 and G = 1.
Example 2 (Logistic model). In the Logistic model the realized demand yt is supported on {0, 1},
following the Logistic distribution Pr[yt = 1|φt, θ∗] = eφ>t θ∗/(1 + eφ>t θ∗). It is easy to verify that
the Logistic model falls into Eq. (2) with ζ = 1, m(z) = ln(1+ez), f(z) = m′(z) = ez/(1+ez) and
h(y) = 1. The Logistic model also satisfies all imposed conditions with s = 1, K = (1 + e2)2/e2
and G = 1.
3.2 Anticipating differential privacy
Differential privacy is a mathematically rigorous measure of privacy protection and has been
extensively studied and applied since its proposal in the work of Dwork et al. (2006b). At a
higher level, the fundamental concept behind differential privacy is the impossibility of distin-
guishing two “neighboring databases” (differing only on a single entry) with high probability,
1This setting is known as the “oblivious adversary” model in the contextual bandit literature. While this model
is weaker than the “fully adversarial” one mostly studied in the literature, we adopt the oblivious adversary model
for a more convenient treatment of privacy constraints as {xt} will not depend on the offered prices or the randomly
realized demands.
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based on publicly available information about the database. To facilitate such probabilistic
indistinguishability, the conventional approach is to artificially inject stochastic noise into the
process or the outputs of differentially private algorithms.
In the context of dynamic personalized pricing, a database D consists of sensitive data
{(xt, yt)}Tt=1 for all of the T customers. For convenience of presentation we also write ot =
(xt, yt). For technical reasons, in our privacy analysis we assume the realized demands are
uniformly bounded in all databases. That is, there exists a parameter BY < ∞ such that
|yt| ≤ BY for all time periods t in all databases D. It is easy to see that, for some demand models
such as the Logistic model, |yt| ≤ 1 almost surely. For other demand models, BY . s
√
lnT
with high probability because of the sub-Gaussianity of the stochastic noises {ξt}.
A database D′ that is a neighboring database of D if and only if D′ and D only differ at a
single time period. More specifically, D = {ot}Tt=1, D′ = {o′t}Tt=1 are neighboring databases if
there exists t such that ot 6= o′t and oτ = o′τ for all τ 6= t. Suppose an algorithm A operates
with input database D and produces randomized output A(D). The following definition gives
a rigorous formulation of (ε, δ)-differential privacy:
Definition 1 ((ε, δ)-differential privacy (Dwork et al. 2006a)). For ε, δ > 0, a randomized
algorithm A satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for every pair of neighboring databases D,D′
and measurable set A, it holds that
Pr[A(D) ∈ A] ≤ eε Pr[A(D′) ∈ A] + δ.
In the setting of dynamic pricing, A(D) can be understood as the price sequence output
(p1, . . . , pT ) of the randomized algorithm A on the input database D. While being a widely
adopted measure, the DP notion as stated in Definition 1 cannot be directly applied to dynamic
pricing for several reasons. First, the definition in 1 would not lead to useful pricing policies.
This is because, essentially, Definition 1 requires that conditioned on the output of the entire
posted price sequence, the adversary cannot distinguish between ot and o
′
t in a probabilistic
sense. On the other hand, for high-profit personalized pricing policies, once the customer’s
personal information xt changes, the price pt offered to that customer must change accordingly
in order to achieve high expected revenue, making inference of xt much more possible given pt.
Furthermore, as we have discussed in the previous paragraphs, the communications of (xt, pt, yt)
at time t are secured in practice and therefore, an adversary should not be have the capability
of accessing the price pt at time t. From this perspective, the classical DP notion defined in
Definition 1 might be too strong since it implicitly allows the adversary access the price at time
t (as pt belongs to the output A(D)). In a practical setting, however, the adversary only be able
to access information during other time periods (e.g., by maliciously sending fake customers to
obtain price quotes) to infer the sensitive information about an individual at time t.
The above argument can be made rigorous by the following proposition, which shows that
any policy satisfying the (ε, δ)-differential privacy in Definition 1 must suffer regret that is linear
in the time horizon T . The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the supplementary material.
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Proposition 1. Let pi be a contextual pricing policy over T periods that satisfies (ε, δ)-differential
privacy as defined in Definition 1, with ε < ln(2) and δ < 1/4. Then the worst-case regret of pi
is lower bounded by Ω(T ).
To address the challenges mentioned above, Shariff & Sheffet (2018) proposed a notion of
“joint DP” in the context of linear contextual bandits. We adopt this notion but refer to it as
anticipating DP. The notion of anticipating DP highlights the key property of this definition
and our focus on more general dynamic personalized pricing policies.
Definition 2 (anticipating (ε, δ)-differential privacy). Let ε, δ > 0 be privacy parameters. A
dynamic personalized pricing policy pi satisfies anticipating (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for any
pair of neighboring databases D,D′ differing at time t (i.e., ot 6= o′t) and measurable set P>t, it
holds that
Pr[pt+1, · · · , pT ∈ P>t|pi,D] ≤ eε Pr[pt+1, · · · , pT ∈ P>t|pi,D′] + δ. (3)
Intuitively, the anticipating (ε, δ)-differential privacy restricts potential seekers of private
information about customer t to those data released after time period t. In particular, it says
that changing the information ot = (xt, yt) at time t will not significantly affect the future price
decisions in a probabilistic sense as defined in (3). Such restrictions are motivated by the fact
that, the communication about (xt, pt, yt) at time t is secured and the data prior to time t really
has no impact on the privacy of customer t since the pricing algorithm has no knowledge of
xt before time t. With the formulation of anticipating differential privacy, the three challenges
we mentioned earlier are resolved because the pricing decision pt at time t is no longer in the
information set of a potential attacker.
Both privacy notions emphasize on the anticipating nature of the problem, meaning that
privacy attackers only have access to released data after the time period of interest.
We also remark that all privacy definitions in this section are model-free, meaning that they
do not depend on how realized demands yt are modeled. Hence, the privacy guarantees of our
proposed algorithm are independent from the generalized linear demand model in Eqs. (1,2).
This fact is essential in practical implementations of privacy-aware algorithms because one
cannot build privacy guarantees of an algorithm on a specific underlying model, which may
or may not hold in reality. The modeling assumptions, on the other hand, are required for
performance analysis (also known as utility analysis, e.g., regret upper bounds or convergence
results) of our proposed privacy-aware pricing policies.
4 Algorithmic Framework
In this section we present the framework of our proposed privacy-aware dynamic personal-
ized pricing algorithm. We first review two important concepts in DP: composition and post-
processing, which will help understand the privacy separation and decompositions of our frame-
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work. We then proceed to introduce two types of routines used in our algorithm: the private
releasers that access the sensitive database and produce differentially private outputs, and the
price optimizers that access only the outputs from private releasers to assign near-optimal and
privacy-aware prices. Finally a pseudo-code description of our main algorithm is presented and
discussed.
4.1 Composition and post-processing in differential privacy
Composition and post-processing are two fundamental concepts in designing complex differen-
tially private systems. In this section, we give an easy-to-understand introduction to the two
concepts and how they are applied in our algorithm design. For a full technical treatment and
historical motivations the readers are referred to the excellent review by Dwork & Roth (2014).
4.1.1 Composition.
When a differentially private algorithm only outputs a single statistic (e.g., the sample mean of
the database), Definition 1 is easy to check and verify. In reality, however, a useful differentially
private protocol is tasked to release several statistics (sometimes with adaptively chosen queries)
and the entire output sequence of a protocol needs to be differentially private. With multiple
output statistics the Definition 1 involve high-dimensional vector spaces and are therefore diffi-
cult to check and verify. Composition, on the other hand, provide convenient upper bounds on
the privacy guarantee of composite outputs using privacy guarantees of individual queries.
More specifically, let A = (A1, · · · , Ak) be a collection of k adaptively chosen queries and
suppose that each query Ak satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy as defined in Definition 1. The
following result is standard in the literature and cited from Theorems 3.15, 3.20 from (Dwork
& Roth 2014).
Fact 1. The composite query A satisfies (ε′, δ′)-differential privacy with either one of the fol-
lowings:
1. (Basic composition) ε′ = kε, δ′ = kδ;
2. (Advanced composition) ε′ =
√
2k ln(1/δ˜)ε+ kε(eε − 1), δ′ = kδ + δ˜ for δ˜ > 0.
Corollary 1 (Corollary 3.21, (Dwork & Roth 2014)). Given target privacy level 0 < ε′ < 1,
δ′ > 0 of the composite query A, it is sufficient for each sub-query to be (ε, δ)-differentially
private with ε = ε′/2
√
2k ln(2k/δ) and δ = δ′/2k.
4.1.2 Post-processing.
Practical privacy-aware algorithms usually involve several separate sub-routines. Most of the
cases, not all sub-routines access the sensitive database: some sub-routines may only process
the results from other sub-routines. The principle of post-processing states that one only needs
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to preserve the privacy of those sub-routines with access to the sensitive database in order to
argue for privacy protection of the entire algorithm.
More specifically, let A be a sub-routine with access to the sensitive database and B be a
sub-routine that only depends on the results of A.
Fact 2 (Proposition 2.1, (Dwork & Roth 2014)). Suppose the outputs of sub-routine A sat-
isfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy. Then the outputs of sub-routine B also satisfy (ε, δ)-differential
privacy.
4.2 Discussion: insufficiency of input perturbation
Input perturbation is a straightforward method for designing differentially private algorithms
and is actually an effective method in some application scenarios. The high-level idea of input
perturbation is to artificially calibrate noise directly to the inputs of the algorithm whose privacy
need to be protected. With noisy inputs, the privacy of the entire algorithm trivially follows
from the closeness-to-post-processing property of differential privacy (Fact 2).
In the context of personalized dynamic pricing, application of the input perturbation method
amounts to calibrating noise directly to the personal features xt of each incoming customer:
x˜t = xt + ωt, for some centered noise vectors {ωt}Tt=1. Such an approach, however, has two
significant issues. The first issue is that the features of each individual customer are relatively
independent from each other. Therefore, a very large magnitude of noises {ωt} need to be
injected, which renders the subsequent pricing algorithm impractical. Furthermore, according
to the composition property of differential privacy (Fact 1) to release T perturbed context
vectors, the noise levels of individual statistics need to be multiplied either a T or a
√
T factor.
This makes the noise levels too high to be of any practical or theoretical interest.
4.3 Private releasers and price optimizers
Our proposed privacy-preserving dynamic personalized pricing algorithm consists of several
sub-routines. We divide the sub-routines into two classes: the private releasers and the price
optimizers.
The private releasers access the sensitive database {xt, pt, yt}Tt=1 and outputs differentially
private intermediate results. For example, in Figure 1 the PrivateCov routine returns differ-
entially private sample covariance matrices and the PrivateMLE routine returns differentially
private maximum likelihood estimates. For private releaser routines, the differential privacy
notions are classical (in Definition 1). Note that, in addition to differential privacy guarantees,
the sub-routines also need to satisfy the anticipating constraints for pricing algorithms (i.e.,
accessing only {xτ , yτ , pτ}τ<t to produce any outputs being used at time t).
The price optimizer on the other hand, performs optimization and outputs the prices pt
for each time period t. To ensure privacy, our designed price optimizer will not directly access
historical sensitive data {xτ , yτ , pτ}τ<t. Instead, it optimizes the offering price pt based only on
xt (the personal information of the incoming customer) and intermediate quantities computed
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by private releasers up to time t.
Because our designed price optimizer has access to xt at time t, one cannot directly apply
the post-processing rule in Fact 2 to argue privacy guarantees. Nevertheless, the following
proposition shows that if all private releasers are differentially private then so is the price
optimizer in the sense of anticipating differential privacy in Definition 2.
Proposition 2. Let (a1, · · · , aT ) be the outputs of private releasers at each time period t and
suppose the entire output sequence (a1, · · · , aT ) satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy. Suppose the
price pt at time t is a deterministic function of xt and a1, · · · , at−1. Then the pricing policy
satisfies anticipating (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Remark 1. The conclusion in Proposition 2 holds for pt as randomized functions of xt, a1, · · · , at−1
as well. Nevertheless, because in our proposed algorithm the price optimizer is deterministic we
shall restrict ourselves to deterministic functions.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2. LetD,D′ be a pair of neighboring databases differing only on time
t. For every time period τ , suppose pτ = fτ (xτ , a1, · · · , aτ−1) for some deterministic function fτ .
Let P>t be a measurable set over pt+1, · · · , pT . Define A := {a1, · · · , aT : fτ (xτ , a1, · · · , aτ−1) =
pτ ,∀τ > t}. Because xτ = x′τ for all τ > t, the set A is the same under D and D′. Note
that our definition of anticipating privacy plays a key role here since we only care about the
future prices, while D and D′ only differs at time t. Therefore, Pr[pt+1, · · · , pT ∈ P>t|pi,D] =
Pr[a1, · · · , aT ∈ A|pi,D] and Pr[pt+1, · · · , pT ∈ P>t|pi,D′] = Pr[a1, · · · , aT ∈ A|pi,D′]. Ad-
ditionally, because (a1, · · · , aT ) are (ε, δ)-differentially private it holds that Pr[a1, · · · , aT ∈
A|pi,D] ≤ eε Pr[a1, · · · , aT ∈ A|pi,D′] + δ. Subsequently, Pr[pt+1, · · · , pT ∈ P>t|pi,D] ≤
eε Pr[pt+1, · · · , pT ∈ P>t|pi,D′] + δ, which is to be demonstrated. 
4.4 Our policy
In Figure 1 we depict a high-level framework of our privacy-aware dynamic personalized pricing
policy. It shows a three-layer structure of the proposed policy. The first layer is the sensitive
database, consisting of data {ot = (pt, xt, yt)}Tt=1 whose privacy we wish to protect. The second
layer is private releasers, which consists of two sub-routines PrivateCov (see Algorithm 2 in
Section 5.1) and PrivateMLE (see Algorithm 3 in Section 5.2). The PrivateCov sub-routine
supplies differentially private sample covariance matrices Λpn ∈ Rd×d at every time period. The
PrivateMLE sub-routine outputs differentially private maximum likelihood estimates θ̂pn, but
only when such estimates are requested by the price optimizer. The PrivateCov sub-routine is
designed to be (ε1, δ1)-differentially private and the PrivateMLE routine (ε2, δ2)-differentially
private, so that all outputs from private releasers are (ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2)-differentially private,
thanks to the basic composition rule in Fact 1.
The third layer of our proposed policy is the price optimizer. As discussed in the previous
section, to ensure privacy the price optimizer shall not access the sensitive database D directly.
Instead it should base its decision of pt on outputs from private releasers and xt only. The last
block in Figure 1 illustrates the basic flow of our price optimizer. The price optimizer maintains
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𝑜!, 𝑜", … , 𝑜# Sensitive Data𝑜! = 𝑥!, 𝑦!
PrivateCov PrivateMLE
Private Releasers
PrivateCov: sample cov.
PrivateMLE: MLE estimates
Obtain Λ!" from 
PrivateCov
det Λ!" > 2det(Λ") ?
At time n: YES
NO
Set Λ" = Λ!" and obtain.𝜃" = .𝜃!" from PrivateMLE
Keep Λ" and .𝜃" unchanged Price optimizer
𝑝! = argmax" 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑓(𝜙!# .𝜃") + 𝐶𝐼$ 𝜙!, Λ"
(𝜀%, 𝛿%)-DP (𝜀&, 𝛿&)-DP
Figure 1: Our algorithm framework. Details and explanations in Sec. 4.4 in the main text.
Λp and θ̂p throughout the pricing process, both of which are obtained directly from private
releasers without accessing the sensitive database. At the beginning of time period n, the price
optimizer first obtains sample covariance Λpn from the PrivateCov routine. The optimizer then
decides whether to request fresh MLE from the PrivateMLE routine by comparing det(Λpn)
with det(Λp), in addition to some other criteria specified in Algorithm 1. Afterwards, pt is
selected as the maximizer of an upper confidence bound of the expected revenue on xt. It is
only this step that the personal information xt is involved.
Algorithm 1 also gives a pseudo-code description of our proposed pricing policy, which is
more accurate and detailed than Figure 1. Note that Algorithm 1 involves several algorithmic
parameters, such as T0, D∞, γ and ρ, which do not affect the privacy guarantees of the algorithm
but does have an impact on its performance. How to set these algorithmic parameters will be
given later in Sec. 6 when we analyze the regret performance of Algorithm 1.
5 Design and Analysis of Private Releasers
In this section, we give detailed designs of the two private releasers: the PrivateCov sub-
routine and the PrivateMLE sub-routine. We prove that both of them satisfy (ε, δ)-differential
privacy as defined in Definition 1. We also prove several utility guarantees that will be helpful
later in the regret analysis of the pricing policy.
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Algorithm 1 The framework of privacy-aware dynamic personalized pricing
1: Input: privacy parameters ε1, δ1, ε2, δ2 > 0, number of pure-exploration periods T0, maximum
number of PrivateMLE calls D∞, regularization parameter ρ ≥ 1, confidence parameter
γ > 0.
2: Output: the offering prices p1, p2, · · · , pT ;
3: δ′2 =
δ2
2D∞ , ε
′
2 ← ε22√2D∞ ln(1/δ′2) , Λ
p = ρId, θ̂
p = 0, DMLE = 0;
4: For the first T0 time periods, offer prices pt uniformly at random from [0, 1];
5: for n = T0 + 1, · · · , T do
6: Obtain Σpn ← PrivateCov(n, ε1, δ1) and let Λpn = Σpn + ρId;
7: if det(Λpn) > 2 det(Λp) and DMLE < D∞ then
8: θ̂p ← PrivateMLE(n, ρ, ε′2, δ′2), Λp ← Λpn, DMLE ← DMLE + 1;
9: end if
10: Offer price pn = arg maxp∈[0,1] min{1, pf(φ>n θ̂p) + γ
√
φ>n (Λp)−1φn}, where φn = φ(xn, pn);
11: end for
Algorithm 2 The PrivateCov sub-routine
1: function PrivateCov(T, ε, δ) . returns Σp1, · · · ,ΣpT−1
2: δ′ ← δ2dlog2 T e , ε
′ ← ε2dlog2 T e ln(1/δ′) , σ
2
ε′,δ′ =
2 ln(1.25/δ′)
(ε′)2 , m = dlog2 T e;
3: Initialize Σ(`) = Σ̂(`) = 0 for all ` = 0, · · · ,m− 1;
4: for n = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1 do
5: Express n in its binary form: n =
∑m−1
`=0 bn(`)2
`, bn(`) ∈ {0, 1};
6: Let `n ← min{` : bn(`) = 1} be the least significant bit of n;
7: Update Σ(`n)← φnφ>n +
∑
`<`n
Σ(`) and Σ(`)← Σ̂(`)← 0 for all ` < `n;
8: Calibrate noise: Σ̂(`n)← Σ(`n) +Wn where Wnij = Wnji i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2ε′,δ′);
9: Release Σpn =
∑m−1
`=0 bn(`)Σ̂(`);
10: end for
11: end function
5.1 The PrivateCov sub-routine
Algorithm 2 gives a pseudo-code description of the PrivateCov sub-routine. Note that in
Algorithm 2 the Σpn covariance matrices are released sequentially once each time period, and
PrivateCov(n, ε, δ) would simply be the Σpn matrix released at the end of iteration n− 1.
Algorithm 2 is based on the AnalyzeGauss framework in (Dwork et al. 2014) coupled with
the tree-based aggregation technique for releasing continual observations (Dwork et al. 2010,
Chan et al. 2011). By calibrating symmetric random Gaussian matrices {Wn} into the sample
covariances one achieves differential privacy. The following proposition claims that the outputs
(Σp1, · · · ,ΣpT−1) of Algorithm 2 satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Proposition 3. The outputs of Algorithm 2, (Σp1, . . . ,Σ
p
T−1) satisfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 3. Because ‖φt‖2 ≤ 1 almost surely, Sec. 3 and Algorithm 1 in
(Dwork et al. 2014) shows that each Σ̂(`) satisfies (ε′, δ′)-differential privacy. Additionally, The-
orem 3.5 in (Chan et al. 2011) shows that each Σpn involves at most m = dlog2 T e differentially
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private partial sums. By switching the basic composition argument in Theorem 3.5 of (Chan
et al. 2011) to advanced composition (Corollary 1), we have that the entire procedure satisfies
(ε, δ)-differential privacy. 
The following lemma further gives high probability bounds on the deviation from Σpn to the
actual sample covariance Σn =
∑n
t=1 φtφ
>
t . This utility guarantee is useful later in the regret
analysis to justify the det(Λpn) > 2 det(Λ
p) condition in Algorithm 1.
Lemma 1. With probability 1−O(T−1), it holds for all n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T − 1} that
‖Σpn − Σn‖op ≤ O(ε−1
√
d ln4.5(T/δ)),
where Σn =
∑
t≤n φtφ
>
t .
Proof. Proof of Lemma 1. First fix n. Invoking Corollary 2.3.6 from Tao (2012), there exist
constants c, C > 0 such that, for every a ≥ C,
Pr[‖Wn‖op > σε′,δ′a
√
d] ≤ Ce−cad.
Equating the right-hand side of the above inequality with 1/T 2 and applying union bound over
all T periods, we have with probability 1−O(T−1) that
‖Wn‖op ≤ σε′,δ′ min
{
C
√
d,
ln(CT 2)
c
√
d
}
, ∀n.
Note that for each n, the difference between Σpn and Σn involves at most m = dlog2 T e noise
matrices W . Subsequently, for every n,
‖Σpn − Σn‖op ≤ mmax
n
‖Wn‖op ≤ σε′,δ′ lnT ×O(
√
d, ln(T )/
√
d) ≤ σε′,δ′ ×O(
√
d ln2 T )
≤ 2dlog2 T e ln(1/δ
′)
ε
×
√
2 ln(1.25/δ′)×O(
√
d ln2 T ) = O(ε−1
√
d ln4.5(T/δ)),
which is to be demonstrated. 
Corollary 2. Let Λn = Σn+ρId and Λ
p
n = Σ
p
n+ρId for some ρ ≥ ε−1d
√
d ln5(T/δ). Then there
exists a universal constant CT <∞ such that, for any T ≥ CT , with probability 1−O(T−1) for
all n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T − 1}, it holds that 0.9 det(Λn) ≤ det(Λpn) ≤ 1.11 det(Λn).
Proof. Proof of Corollary 2. Let {λnj , λ˜nj }dj=1 be the eigenvalues of Λn,Λpn, respectively, which are
all real since Σn,Σ
p
n are symmetric. By Lemma 1 and Weyl’s theorem, we have with probability
1−O(T−1) uniformly over all n that
∣∣λnj − λ˜nj ∣∣ = O(ε−1√d ln4.5(T/δ)), ∀j. (4)
On the other hand, because Σn =
∑
t≤n φtφ
>
t is positive semi-definite, λ
n
j ≥ ρ ≥ ε−1d
√
d ln5(T/δ)
for all j and n. Subsequently, there exists a universal constant CT < ∞ such that for any
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Algorithm 3 The PrivateMLE sub-routine
1: function PrivateMLE(n, ρ, ε, δ) . returns θ̂pn
2: B1 ← (BY + 1)G, B2 ← KG, ρ← max{ρ, 2B2/ε}, ν2ε,δ ← B21(8 ln(2/δ) + 4ε)/ε2;
3: Sample w ∼ N (0, ν2ε,δId);
4: Return θ̂pn = arg min‖θ‖2≤2{(
∑
t<n− ln p(yt|φt, θ)) + ρ2‖θ‖22 + w>θ};
5: end function
T ≥ CT , with probability 1−O(T−1) uniformly over all n and j that
∣∣λnj − λ˜nj ∣∣ ≤ 0.1d λnj .
Subsequently, det(Λpn) ≤ (1 + 0.1d )d det(Λn) ≤ e0.1 det(Λn) ≤ 1.11 det(Λn) and det(Λpn) ≥ (1 −
0.1
d )
d det(Λn) ≥ e−0.1 det(Λn) ≥ 0.9 det(Λn), which are to be demonstrated. 
5.2 The PrivateMLE sub-routine
Algorithm 3 gives a pseudo-code description of the PrivateMLE sub-routine. The algorithm
is based on the “objective perturbation” framework developed in (Chaudhuri et al. 2011, Kifer
et al. 2012). More specifically, Algorithm 3 calibrates an noisy term (w>θ) into the constrained
maximum likelihood estimation formulation in order to achieve differential privacy of the output
optimal solutions θ̂pn.
The following proposition establishes the claim that Algorithm 3 is (ε, δ)-differentially pri-
vate.
Proposition 4. The output of Algorithm 3, θ̂pn, satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 4. The proof of privacy amounts to verify the several conditions in
Theorem 2 of Kifer et al. (2012) hold true.
First we verify that the objective
∑
t<n− ln p(yt|φt, θ) is convex with respect to θ. Recall
that p(yt|φt, θ) = exp{ζ(ytφ>t θ−m(φ>t θ))+h(yt, ζ)}. Taking the first and the second derivatives,
we have that
−∇θ ln p(yt|φt, θ) = ζ(m′(φ>t θ)− yt)φt = ζ(f(φ>t θ)− yt)φt;
−∇2θ ln p(yt|φt, θ) = ζf ′(φ>t θ)φtφ>t .
Because ζ ≥ G−1 > 0 and f ′(·) ≥ K−1 > 0, we have that −∇2θ ln p(yt|φt, θ)  0 for all θ. This
shows that the objective function is convex with respect to θ.
We next upper bound the gradients and Hessian matrices. Recall that we assume the realized
demands yt are uniformly bounded by BY in all periods and databases. Furthermore, ζ ≤ G,
f(·) ∈ [0, 1], f ′(·) ≤ K and ‖φt‖2 ≤ 1 almost surely. Hence, ‖−∇θ ln p(yt|φt, θ)‖2 ≤ (BY +1)G =
B1, ‖ − ∇2θ ln p(yt|φt, θ)‖op ≤ KG = B2 for all t and θ. Invoking Theorem 2 of (Kifer et al.
2012) we complete the proof of Proposition 4. 
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Corollary 3. Suppose PrivateMLE is invoked for at most D∞ times in Algorithm 1. Then the
composite sequence of D∞ outputs of PrivateMLE satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy if each
call of PrivateMLE is supplied with privacy parameters δ′ = δ2D∞ and ε
′ = ε√
2D∞ ln(1/δ′)
.
Corollary 3 immediately follows Proposition 4 and Corollary 1.
Now, we are ready to provide the privacy guarantee of the entire policy in Algorithm 1.
Corollary 4. The price decisions {p1, . . . , pT } of Algorithm 1 satisfy (ε1+ε2, δ1+δ2)-differential
privacy.
Corollary 4 immediately follows Proposition 3, Corollary 3, Proposition 2, and Fact 1. More
specifically, in Algorithm 1, PrivateCov is invoked with parameters (ε1, δ1), which is (ε1, δ1)-
differential privacy. Moreover, PrivateMLE is invoked with parameters (ε′2, δ
′
2) for at most
D∞ times, whose outputs are (ε2, δ2)-differential privacy. Therefore, the entire policy satisfies
(ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2)-differential privacy, thanks to Proposition 2 and the basic composition rule in
Fact 1.
In the rest of this section we establish several useful utility guarantees. We emphasize that
the utility guarantees we established in this paper are not directly covered by existing utility
analysis in Chaudhuri et al. (2011), Kifer et al. (2012) for two reasons. First, in Chaudhuri
et al. (2011), Kifer et al. (2012) the utility is measured in terms of the difference between
objective values before and after objective perturbation, which is not sufficient for the purpose of
analyzing contextual bandit algorithms that requires first-order KKT conditions. Additionally,
in both Chaudhuri et al. (2011), Kifer et al. (2012) the data (φt, yt) are assumed to be sampled
independently and identically from an underlying distribution, while in our problem the data
clearly are neither independent nor identically distributed.
We also remark that our utility analysis of the (differentially private) constrained maximum
likelihood estimation differs significantly from existing analysis of generalized linear contextual
bandit problems as well (Filippi et al. 2010, Li et al. 2017, Wang et al. 2019). In Li et al.
(2017), it is assumed that φt are i.i.d. and their distributions satisfy a certain non-degenerate
assumption, which we do not necessarily impose in this paper. In both Filippi et al. (2010)
and Wang et al. (2019), the formulations of the optimization problems are non-convex in θ,
which facilitates the analysis of the properties of optimal solution. However, the non-convex
formulation poses significant challenges for privacy-aware algorithms since differentially private
methods for non-convex optimization are scarce. It is therefore a highly non-trivial task to
analyze a fully convex optimization formulation without stochasticity assumptions on φt.
Our utility claims of Algorithm 3 can be separated into three technical lemmas. Due to
space constraints all proofs of the lemmas are relegated to the supplementary material.
Lemma 2. Fix n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T}. For every t < n, define `t(θ) = Ey∼p(·|φt,θ∗)[− ln p(y|φt, θ)].
Define Fn(θ) = Ln(θ) +
ρ
2‖θ‖22 + w>θ where Ln(θ) =
∑
t<n `t(θ) and w ∼ N (0, ν2ε,δI). Let θ∗ρ
be defined as
θ∗ρ = arg min
θ∈Rd
Fn(θ).
If ρ ≥ 5νε,δ
√
5d lnT then with probability 1−O(T−2) it holds that ‖θ∗ρ‖2 ≤ 1.5.
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Lemma 3. Fix n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T}. For every t < n, define ̂`t(θ) = − ln p(yt|φt, θ). Define
F̂n(θ) = L̂n(θ)+
ρ
2‖θ‖22 +w>θ where L̂n(θ) =
∑
t<n
̂`
t(θ) and w ∼ N (0, ν2ε,δI). Let θ̂ρ be defined
as
θ̂ρ = arg min
θ∈Rd
F̂n(θ).
If ρ ≥ max{5νε,δ
√
5d lnT , 2 + 48s2G2Kd lnT} then with probability 1 − O(T−2) it holds that
‖θ̂ρ‖2 < 2.
At a higher level, Lemmas 2 and 3 show that, if the smoothing term ρ2‖θ‖22 is not too small,
both global minimizers of Fn and F̂n have bounded norms with high probability. Despite their
apparent similarities, the proof strategies of Lemmas 2 and 3 are quite different. Lemma 2 is
proved by noting that θ∗ is the global minimizer of Ln(·), and any θ∗ρ with norm substantially
larger than ‖θ∗‖2 ≤ 1 must incur a large penalty through the ρ2‖θ‖22 term when ρ is not too
small. On the other hand, Lemma 3 is proved by noting that F̂n is strongly convex and |F̂n−Fn|
is small, and therefore θ̂ρ cannot deviate too much from θ
∗
ρ.
Our next lemma establishes error upper bounds on the differentially private estimate θ̂pn.
Lemma 4. Fix n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T − 1} and let Λn = Σn + ρI =
∑
t<n φtφ
>
t + ρI. Suppose
ρ ≥ max{5νε,δ
√
5d lnT , 2 + 48s2G2Kd lnT}. Then with probability 1 − O(T−2) the following
hold: ‖θ̂pn‖2 < 2, and
(θ̂pn − θ∗)Λn(θ̂pn − θ∗) ≤
(
sK
√
3d lnT + (2G+ 3)
√
ρ+Gνε,δ
√
5d lnT
)2
. (5)
Furthermore, if λmin(Σn) ≥ λ0 = [ (2G+3)ρ√5d lnT +νε,δG]2 then the above inequality can be strengthened
to
(θ̂pn − θ∗)Λn(θ̂pn − θ∗) ≤ [4sK
√
d lnT ]2. (6)
Lemma 4 is proved by analyzing the first-order KKT condition at θ̂pn, and is deferred to
the supplementary material. Lemma 4 upper bounds the transformed estimation error of the
differentially private MLE θ̂pn in two upper bounds. The first upper bound in (5) applies to
the general setting and has a Gνε,δ
√
5d lnT additive term involving the differential privacy
parameters ε, δ. in the upper bound. The second upper bound in (6), on the other hand, shows
that if the sample covariance matrix Σn is spectrally lower bounded then the upper bound on
‖θ̂pn − θ∗‖2Λn can be much improved with only the standard O(
√
d lnT ) term.
6 Regret Analysis
The previous Section 5 has established the privacy guarantees of our dynamic personalized
pricing policy (see Corollary 4). In this section, we will further analyze the performance/utility
of our proposed policy by proving upper bounds on its expected cumulative regret.
Recall that in the dynamic personalized pricing problem, there are t time periods and at each
time period a customer arrives with personal information xt. When offered price pt, the expected
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demand is modeled by the generalized linear model p(yt|pt, xt, θ∗) = exp{ζ(yφ(pt, xt)>θ∗ −
m(φ(pt, xt)
>θ∗) + h(yt, ζ)} with expectation E[yt|pt, xt, θ∗] = f(φ(pt, xt)>θ∗). With θ∗ known
in hindsight, the optimal price p∗t at time t is the one maximizing the retailer’s expected revenue,
or more specifically
p∗t := arg max
p∈[0,1]
pf(φ(p, xt)
>θ∗).
The regret of a dynamic pricing policy pi is then defined as the cumulative difference between
the expected revenue of the policy’s offered prices and that of a clairvoyant, or more specifically
Regret(pi;T ) :=
T∑
t=1
p∗t f(φ(p
∗
t , xt)
>θ∗)− ptf(φ(pt, xt)>θ∗).
Clearly by definition the regret of any admissible policy is always non-negative since no pt has
a higher expected revenue compared to p∗t . The smaller the regret, the better the policy’s
performance is. We are also primarily focused on the asymptotic growth of the regret as a
function of the time horizon T , as well as several other important parameters such as the
feature dimension d and the privacy parameters ε0 := ε1 + ε2, δ0 := δ1 + δ2.
6.1 The general case
We first analyze the regret of Algorithm 1 in the most general case, in which the customers’
personal information {xt} are obliviously (i.e., pre-fixed) but can be adversarially chosen with
no pre-assumed patterns. Our next theorem upper bounds the regret of Algorithm 1 with proper
choices of the values of algorithmic parameters. Recall that ε0 := ε1 + ε2, δ0 := δ1 + δ2. We
also note that for the general case, the random exploration phase (Step 4 in Algorithm 1) will
be unnecessary and thus we could set T0 = 0.
Theorem 1. Suppose Algorithm 1 is run with parameters ε1, ε2 ≥ 0.1ε0, δ1, δ2 ≥ 0.1δ0, T0 = 0,
D∞ = dd log1.5 T e, ρ = max{ε−11 d1.5 ln5 T, 5νε′2,δ′2
√
5d lnT , 2+48s2G2Kd lnT}, γ = K[(√3sK+√
5Gνε′2,δ′2)
√
d lnT + (2G + 3)
√
ρ], where ε′2, δ
′
2 are defined in Step 3 of Algorithm 1 and νε′2,δ′2
is defined in Algorithm 3. Then it holds that
Regret(pi;T ) ≤ 2γ
√
4.6dT lnT ≤ O˜
(
ε−10
√
d3T ln5(1/δ0)
)
,
where in the O˜(·) notation we omit logarithmic terms in T and polynomial dependency on other
model parameters s,K,G and BY .
We note that when T is large, our regret bound matches the classical optimal regret bound
of O(
√
T ). The dependency on the dimensionality of personal information d (i.e.,
√
d3) can
be further improved by assuming a stronger assumption on the stochasticity of personal infor-
mation xt (see Section 6.2). Stochastic personal information or demand covariate have been a
common assumption in the pricing literature(see e.g., Qiang & Bayati 2016, Ban & Keskin 2017,
Javanmard & Nazerzadeh 2019, Chen et al. 2020).
In the rest of this section we sketch the proof of Theorem 1. Due to space constraints, we
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only state the key steps in the proof while defer detailed proofs of technical lemmas to the
supplementary materials. Our first lemma shows the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
det(Λpn) ≥ 2 det(Λp) condition in Step 7 of Algorithm 1 to be met:
Lemma 5. For every time period n recall the definition that Σn =
∑
t<n φtφ
>
t and Λn = Σn+ρI.
Let also Λp be the “current” private sample covariance maintained in Algorithm 1, and Λ be the
non-private version of the sample covariance corresponding to Λp. With probability 1−O(T−1)
the following holds for every time period n:
1. If det(Λpn) > 2 det(Λ
p) then det(Λn) ≥ 1.5 det(Λ);
2. If det(Λn) > 2.5 det(Λ) then det(Λ
p
n) > 2 det(Λ
p).
Proof. Proof of Lemma 5. Obvious by invoking Corollary 2. More specifically, if det(Λpn) ≥
2 det(Λp) then by Corollary 2, det(Λn) ≥ det(Λpn)/1.11 ≥ 2 det(Λp)/1.11 ≥ 2×0.9 det(Λ)/1.11 ≥
1.5 det(Λ). Similarly, if det(Λn) > 2.5 det(Λ) then by Corollary 2, det(Λ
p
n) ≥ 0.9 det(Λn) >
0.9× 2.5 det(Λ) ≥ 0.9× 2.5 det(Λp)/1.1 ≥ 2 det(Λp). 
With Lemma 5 we can upper bound the number of times condition det(Λpn) > 2 det(Λ
p)
is active. Because ‖φt‖2 ≤ 1 almost surely, we have that det(ΛT−1) ≤ (T − 1 + ρ)d. On
the other hand, det(Λ0) = ρ
d. Hence, the number of times det(Λpn) > 2 det(Λ
p) is satisfied
is upper bounded by the number of times det(Λn) ≥ 1.5 det(Λ), which is further bounded by
dlog1.5(T d)e = dd log1.5 T e, because ρ ≥ 1. Comparing this with the definition of D∞, we
conclude that with probability 1 − O(T−1) each det(Λpn) > 2 det(Λp) event leads to a call of
sub-routine PrivateMLE.
Our next lemma shows that with high probability, the constructed upper confidence bound
f(φ(p, xn)
>θ̂p) + γ
√
φ(p, xn)>[Λp]−1φ(p, xn) is a valid upper bound on f(φ(p, xn)>θ∗).
Lemma 6. For each time period n and price p ∈ [0, 1], define rn(p) = pf(φ(p, xn)>θ∗), r̂n(p) =
pf(φ(p, xn)
>θ̂p) and rn(p) = pmin{1, r̂n(p) + γ
√
φ(p, xn)>[Λp]−1φ(p, xn)}. With probability
1−O(T−1) the following holds for every time period t and price p ∈ [0, 1]:
rn(p) ≤ rn(p) ≤ rn(p) + 2γ
√
φ(p, xn)>[Λp]−1φ(p, xn).
Lemma 6 is proved by a standard argument of Cauchy-Schwarz inequality between φ(p, xn)
and θ̂p − θ∗. We relegate its complete proof to the supplementary material.
To prove the regret upper bound in Theorem 1 we need two additional technical lemmas.
Both lemmas are proved in the seminal work of Abbasi-Yadkori et al. (2011) and we omit their
proofs in this paper.
Lemma 7 (Lemma 12, (Abbasi-Yadkori et al. 2011)). Let A,B be positive semi-definite matri-
ces. Then supφ6=0
φ>(A+B)φ
φ>Aφ ≤ det(A+B)detA .
Lemma 8 (Lemma 11, (Abbasi-Yadkori et al. 2011)). For ρ ≥ 1 and ‖φn‖2 ≤ 1 for all n, it
holds that
∑T
n=1 φ
>
nΛ
−1
n φn ≤ 2 ln det(ΛT )det(ρI) ≤ 2d lnT , where Λn =
∑
t<n φtφ
>
t + ρI.
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We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 1. With Lemma 6 and the definition of offered price pn in Algorithm
1, we have with probability 1−O(T−1) that
T∑
n=1
p∗nf(φ(p
∗
n, xn)
>θ∗)− pn(f(φ(pn, xn)>θ∗)) =
T∑
n=1
rn(p
∗
n)− rn(pn)
≤
T∑
n=1
rn(p
∗
n)− rn(pn) + rn(pn)− rn(pn) (7)
≤
T∑
n=1
rn(pn)− rn(pn), (8)
where Eq. (7) holds because rn(·) ≤ rn(·) with high probability, and Eq. (8) holds because pn
is the maximizer of rn(·). Invoking Lemma 6 we have with probability 1−O(T−1) that
rn(pn)− rn(pn) ≤ 2γ
√
φ>n [Λp]−1φn, ∀n, (9)
where φn = φ(xn, pn).
Recall that Λp is the differentially private sample covariance copy kept by Algorithm 1,
which may or may not be updated at time n. Λn =
∑
t<n φtφ
>
t + ρI, on the other hand, is the
true sample covariance at time n. The algorithm pseudo-code and Lemma 5 shows that, with
probability 1−O(T−1), one must have det(Λp) ≥ 0.5 det(Λpn) ≥ 0.45 det(Λn). Subsequently, by
Lemma 7,
φ>n [Λ
p]−1φn ≤ 1
0.45
φ>n [Λn]
−1φn ≤ 2.3φ>nΛ−1n φn. (10)
Combining Eqs. (8,9,10) and invoking Lemma 8, we obtain
T∑
n=1
rn(p
∗
n)− rn(pn) ≤
T∑
n=1
2γ
√
2.3φ>nΛ
−1
n φn ≤ 2γ
√
2.3T ×
√√√√ T∑
n=1
φ>nΛ
−1
n φn
≤ 2γ
√
4.6dT lnT .
Plugging in the scalings of γ and ρ we complete the proof of Theorem 1. 
6.2 Improved regret with stochastic contexts
In this section, we show that for a large class of problems in which the customers’ personal infor-
mation is stochastically distributed, the regret upper bound in Theorem 1 could be significantly
sharpened.
The following assumption mathematically characterizes the stochasticity condition of cus-
tomers’ personal information used in this section:
Assumption 1. Let U [0, 1] be the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. There exists an underlying
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distribution µx and a constant κx > 0 such that, x1, · · · , xT i.i.d.∼ µx, and furthermore
‖φ(x, p)‖2 ≤ 1 a.s. ∼ µx × U [0, 1]; E(x,p)∼µx×U [0,1]
[
φ(p, x)φ(p, x)>
]  κxId.
With Assumption 1, the following theorem shows that when algorithmic parameters are
properly chosen in Algorithm 1, the regret upper bound can be improved compared to Theorem
1 for the general setting.
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1, suppose Algorithm 1 is run with parameters ε1, ε2 ≥ 0.1ε0,
δ1, δ2 ≥ 0.1δ0, D∞ = dd log1.5 T e, ρ = max{ε−11 d1.5 ln5 T, 5νε′2,δ′2
√
5d lnT , 2 + 48s2GKd lnT},
T0 = 32[
(2G+3)ρ√
5d lnT
+ νε,δG]
2 ln2(dT ), γ = 4sK2
√
d lnT , where ε′2, δ
′
2 are defined in Step 3 of
Algorithm 1 and νε′2,δ′2 is defined in Algorithm 3. Then it holds for sufficiently large T ≥ eκ
−2
x
that
Regret(pi, T ) ≤ T0 + 2γ
√
4.6dT lnT ≤ O˜
(
d
√
T + ε−20 d
2 ln10(1/δ0)
)
,
where in the O˜(·) notation we omit logarithmic terms in T and polynomial dependency on other
model parameters s,K,G and BY .
Comparing Theorem 2 with Theorem 1, we note that the significant improvement lies in
the additive nature between ε0, δ0 and d, T terms in Theorem 2. More specifically, because the
privacy incurred terms are now additive and do not scale polynomially with T , in most practical
scenarios when the time horizon T is very large, the dominating term of Theorem 2 becomes
only O˜(d
√
T ). which is optimal (up to logarithmic factors) in both the time horizon T and the
feature dimension d (see, for example, the Ω(d
√
T ) lower bound in Dani et al. (2008)).
The proof of Theorem 2 is largely the same with the proof of Theorem 1, except for the
application of the second upper bound in Lemma 4. The following lemma establishes (with
high probability) a lower bound on the smallest eigenvalue of ΣT0+1 =
∑
t≤T0 φtφ
>
t , which is a
condition for the second upper bound in Lemma 4.
Lemma 9. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and T0 is set as instructed in Theorem 2. Then for
any T ≥ eκ−2x , with probability 1−O(T−1) it holds that λmin(ΣT0+1) ≥ [ (2G+3)ρ√5d lnT + νε,δG]2.
With Lemma 9, Lemma 4 shows that Lemma 6 holds by replacing γ with γ = 4sK2
√
d lnT .
The rest of the proof of Theorem 1 remains unchanged for the proof of Theorem 2.
7 Numerical Results
In this section we corroborate the theoretical guarantees established in this paper for our pro-
posed differentially private personalized pricing method with simulation results on a synthetic
dataset. We adopt the logistic regression model Pr[yt = 1|φt, θ∗] = eζφ
>
t θ
∗
1+eζφ
>
t θ
∗ , with ζ = 4,
φt(xt, pt) =
1√
d
[xt;−pt] ∈ Rd and θ∗ = [−
√
0.1;−√0.1; · · · ;−√0.1;√1− 0.1(d− 1)] ∈ Rd. The
personal feature vectors {xt} are synthesized uniformly at random from the unit cube [−1, 1]d−1.
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Figure 2: Average regret of our proposed algorithm under different time horizons T . The black
dashed line indicates the average regret of a policy offering completely at random prices. Both
δ1, δ2 parameters are set at δ1 = δ2 = 1/T
2.
It is easy to verify that ‖φt‖2 ≤ 1 and ‖θ∗‖2 ≤ 1 always hold for all d. Algorithm parameters
(as inputs in Algorithm 1) are chosen as T0 = 10, ρ = 10, D∞ = dd log2 T e and γ = 1. Other
privacy related parameters will be varied to demonstrate a spectrum of our proposed algorithm
on a continuous landscape of differential privacy guarantees. Note that this experiment’s main
purpose is to investigate the impact of privacy-related parameters (i.e., ε and δ) rather than
compete with state-of-the-art non-private pricing algorithms.
In Figure 2 we plot the average regret of our proposed algorithm under various ε1, ε2 privacy
settings and time horizons T ranging from 105 to 106. All settings are run for 20 independent
trials and the average regret is reported. For reference purposes, we also indicate in both
plots of Figure 2 (see the flat dashed line) the average regret of a policy that simply produces
uniformly at random prices pt at each t, completely ignoring the personalized features/factors
of each incoming customer. As we can see, under most privacy settings including highly secured
settings with small ε (e.g., ε1 = ε2 = 0.02), the average regret of our proposed algorithm is
much smaller compared to completely random prices, demonstrating its utility under privacy
constraints. Furthermore, with relaxed privacy requirements (i.e., larger values of ε1, ε2) and/or
longer pricing horizons T , the average regret of our algorithm significantly decreases, which
verifies the theoretical regret upper bounds we established in Theorems 1 and 2.
In Figures 3 and 4 we provide some additional auxiliary simulation results. Figure 3 gives
a direct landscape of the average regret of our algorithm under ε values ranging from 0.1 to
1. Figure 4 further explores the robustness of our algorithm under several very small δ values
(as small as δ = 1/T 10). Note that on Figure 4 there are multiple trend lines corresponding to
the performances of the proposed algorithm under different settings of T, ε and δ values. Apart
from the dependency on ln(1/δ), Figure 4 also shows that the average regret of our algorithm
decreases with increasing time horizon T and relaxed privacy guarantees (i.e., larger values of
ε), both of which consistent with the findings in Figures 2 and 3. The results in both figures are
as expected (significant decreases in average regret with large ε values and moderate increases
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Figure 3: Average regret of our proposed algorithm under different privacy parameters ε = ε1 = ε2.
Both δ1, δ2 parameters are set at δ1 = δ2 = 1/T
2.
in average regret with geometrically decreasing δ values) from our theoretical results.
8 Conclusions and Future Directions
In this paper, we investigate how to protect the privacy of customer’s personal information
and purchasing decisions in personalized dynamic pricing with demand learning. Under the
generalized linear model of the demand function, we propose a privacy-preserving constrained
MLE policy. We establish both the privacy guarantee under the notion of anticipating differential
privacy (DP) and the regret bounds for oblivious adversarial and stochastic settings.
There are several future directions. First, we could extend the current privacy setting to the
local DP (Elmaghraby & Keskinocak 2003), which is a stronger notion of DP. The local DP is
suitable for distributed environments, as user terminals need to randomize data before sending it
to the center. A very recent paper by Ren et al. (2020) investigates the UCB algorithm under the
local DP. It would be interesting to study the personalized dynamic pricing under this stronger
notion of DP. More importantly, as privacy has become a significant concern from the public,
especially in the e-commerce domain, we believe that systematic research on privacy-preserving
revenue management will become increasingly important in both academia and industry. While
there is relatively less research in this area, we hope our work could inspire more future work
on privacy-aware operations management (e.g., inventory control or assortment optimization)
based on the DP framework.
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Supplementary material
A Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a two-dimensional pricing setting d = 2, with feature map φ(x, p) = (0.5x, 0.5p) for
x ∈ [−1, 1], p ∈ [0, 1] and the hypothetical demand model θ∗ = (0.5,−0.5). The logistic
demand model Pr[dt = 1|pt, xt] = eζφ(xt,pt)
>θ∗
1+eζφ(xt,pt)
>θ∗ is used, with ζ = 8, or equivalently Pr[dt =
1|pt, xt] = e2xt−2pt1+e2xt−2pt . It is easy to verify that, with xt = 1, the optimal price is pt = 1;
with xt = −1, the optimal price is pt ≈ 0.524. Let r∗1 = maxp∈[0,1] pt Pr[dt = 1|pt, xt = 1],
r∗−1 = maxp∈[0,1] pt Pr[dt = 1|pt, xt = −1] be the maximum expected revenue when priced
optimally for xt = 1 and xt = −1. Define
∆∗r := min
p∈[0,1]
max
j∈{1,−1}
{
r∗j − p× Pr[d = 1|p, x = j]
}
as the minimum regret of any fixed price p ∈ [0, 1] under either context x = 1 or x = −1. It is
easy to verify that ∆∗r ≥ 0.001 > 0 and therefore ∆∗r = Ω(1).
For each time t, let Ht−1 := {xτ , yτ , pτ}τ<t be the complete history prior to time t. Because
the policy pi must be non-anticipating and satisfies the (ε, δ)-differential privacy in Definition 1,
for any p ∈ [0, 1] and x, x′ ∈ [−1, 1], it holds that
Pr[pt = p|Ht−1, xt = x] ≤ eε Pr[pt = p|Ht−1, xt = x′] + δ (11)
Let the environment be such that xt = ±1 uniformly at random. Then the expected regret of
a policy pi satisfying Eq. (11) at time t can be lower bounded by
1
2
∑
j∈{1,−1}
∫ 1
0
(r∗j − p× Pr[d = 1|p, xt = j])× Pr[pt = p|Ht−1, xt = j]dp
≥ 1
2
∆∗r ×
∫ 1
0
min
j∈{1,−1}
Pr[pt = p|Ht−1, xt = j]dp
≥ 1
2
∆∗r ×
∫ 1
0
max{0,Pr[pt = p|Ht−1, xt = 1]− δ}
eε
dp (12)
≥ 1
4
∆∗r ×
∫ 1
0
max{0,Pr[pt = p|Ht−1, xt = 1]− 1/4}dp
≥ 1
4
∆∗r × (1− 1/4) (13)
≥ 1
4
× 3
4
∆∗r ≥
3
16
∆∗r = Ω(1),
where in Eq. (12) we apply Eq. (11), and Eq. (13) holds because
∫ 1
0
Pr[pt = p|Ht−1, xt = 1]dp =
1. Summing over all T time periods we obtain the desired Ω(T ) lower bound on the policy pi.
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B Proofs of technical lemmas in Sec. 5.2
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Because E[yt|φt, θ∗] = f(φ>t θ∗) and −∇ ln p(yt|φt, θ) = ζ(f(φ>t θ)−yt)φt, we have that ∇`t(θ) =
−∇E[ln p(y|φt, θ)|θ∗] = ζ(f(φ>t θ)−f(φ>t θ∗))φt. It is easy to verify that Ln =
∑
t<n `t is convex
and ∇Ln(θ∗) = 0. Hence, θ∗ is the global minimizer of Ln and therefore Ln(θ∗) ≤ Ln(θ∗ρ).
Assume by way of contradiction that ‖θ∗ρ‖2 > 1.5. Because ‖θ∗‖2 ≤ 1 and Ln(θ∗) ≤ Ln(θ∗ρ),
we have that
Fn(θ
∗
ρ)− Fn(θ∗) ≥
ρ
2
‖θ∗ρ‖22 −
ρ
2
‖θ∗‖22 −
∣∣〈w, θ∗ρ − θ∗〉∣∣ ≥ ρ2‖θ∗ρ‖22 − ρ2 − ‖w‖2(‖θ∗‖2 + ‖θ∗ρ‖2)
≥ ρ
2
‖θ∗ρ‖22 −
ρ
2
− ‖w‖2 − ‖w‖2‖θ∗ρ‖2
=
(
ρ
2
‖θ∗ρ‖2 − ‖w‖2
)
‖θ∗ρ‖2 −
(
ρ
2
+ ‖w‖2
)
. (14)
Recall that w ∼ N (0, ν2ε,δI). Hence, ‖w‖22/ν2ε,δ follows χ2d distribution. Invoking concentra-
tion inequalities of χ2 random variables from (Laurent & Massart 2000), we have with probability
1−u that ‖z‖22 ≤ d+ 2
√
d ln(1/u) for z ∼ N (0, Id). Subsequently, with probability 1−O(T−2)
it holds that
‖w‖22 ≤ ν2ε,δ(d+ 4
√
d lnT ) ≤ 5ν2ε,δd lnT. (15)
With Eq. (15) and the condition that ρ ≥ 5νε,δ
√
5d lnT , we have that ρ ≥ 5‖w‖2 with
probability 1−O(T−2). Subsequently, with probability 1−O(T−2), Eq. (14) can be simplified
to
Fn(θ
∗
ρ)− Fn(θ∗) ≥
(
ρ
2
3
2
− ρ
5
)
3
2
− ρ
2
− ρ
5
=
ρ
8
> 0,
which contradicts the definition that θ∗ρ is the global minimizer of Fn.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3
To prove Lemma 3 we first establish the following technical lemma, which will also be useful in
later proofs.
Lemma 10. Let ξt = yt − f(φ>t θ∗), which are centered sub-Gaussian random variables with
sub-Gaussian parameter s2. Let Σn =
∑
t<n φtφ
>
t . Then with probability 1 − O(T−2), it holds
uniformly over all ψ ∈ Rd that∣∣∣∣∑
t<n
ξtφ
>
t ψ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ s√3d lnT ×√ψ>(Σn + Id)ψ.
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Proof. Proof of Lemma 10. Abbreviate Λ˜n = Σn + Id. Invoking Theorem 1 of (Abbasi-Yadkori
et al. 2011), we have with probability 1− u that
∥∥∑
t<n
ξtφt
∥∥2
Λ˜−1n
=
(∑
t<n
ξtφt
)>
(Σn + Id)
−1(∑
t<n
ξtφt
) ≤ 2s2 ln(det(Λ˜n)1/2 det(Id)1/2
u
)
(a)
≤ 2s2 ln
(
nd/2
u
)
≤ s2d ln(n/u).
Here Eq. (a) holds because ‖φt‖2 ≤ 1 almost surely, and hence ‖Σn‖op ≤ n−1. Taking u = 1/T 2
we have with probability 1−O(T−2) that
∥∥∑
t<n
ξtφt
∥∥
Λ˜−1n
≤ s
√
3d lnT .
Subsequently, by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have∣∣∣∣∑
t<n
ξtφ
>
t ψ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∥∥∑
t<n
ξtφt
∥∥
Λ˜−1n
‖ψ‖Λ˜n ≤ s
√
3d lnT ×
√
ψ>(Σn + Id)ψ,
which is to be demonstrated. 
We now return to the proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 2, with probability 1−O(T−2) it holds
that ‖θ∗ρ‖2 ≤ 1.5, where θ∗ρ is the global minimizer of Fn. The rest of the proof is conditioned
on the event that ‖θ∗ρ‖2 ≤ 1.5.
The Hessian matrices of Fn and F̂n can be spectrally lower bounded as
∇2F̂n(θ) = ∇2Fn(θ) =
∑
t<n
ζf ′(φ>t θ)φtφ
>
t + ρI 
1
GK
Σn + ρI, ∀‖θ‖2 ≤ 2, (16)
where Σn =
∑
t<n φtφ
>
t and f
′(z) ≥ K−1 for all |z| ≤ 2. Subsequently, for any ‖θ‖2 ≤ 2 it
holds that
Fn(θ) ≥ Fn(θ∗ρ) +
1
2
(θ − θ∗ρ)>
(
1
GK
Σn + ρI
)
(θ − θ∗ρ)
= Fn(θ
∗
ρ) +
1
2GK
(θ − θ∗ρ)Σn(θ − θ∗ρ) +
ρ
2
‖θ − θ∗ρ‖22, (17)
where the first inequality holds because θ∗ρ is the global minimizer of Fn and therefore∇Fn(θ∗ρ) =
0.
On the other hand, recall the definitions of Fn, F̂n as follows:
Fn(θ) =
∑
t<n
ζ(m(φ>t θ)− f(φ>t θ∗)φ>t θ)− Eθ∗ [h(y, ζ)] +
ρ
2
‖θ‖22 + w>θ; (18)
F̂n(θ) =
∑
t<n
ζ(m(φ>t θ)− ytφ>t θ)− h(yt, ζ) +
ρ
2
‖θ‖22 + w>θ. (19)
Comparing Eqs. (18,19) and noting the definition that yt = f(φ
>
t θ
∗) + ξt, we have for every
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θ ∈ Rd that
∣∣[F̂n(θ)− F̂n(θ∗ρ)]− [Fn(θ)− Fn(θ∗ρ)]∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∑
t<n
ζξtφ
>
t (θ − θ∗ρ)
∣∣∣∣.
Invoking Lemma 10 we have with probability 1−O(T−2) for all θ ∈ Rd that
∣∣[F̂n(θ)− F̂n(θ∗ρ)]− [Fn(θ)− Fn(θ∗ρ)]∣∣ ≤ sG√3d lnT√(θ − θ∗ρ)>(Σn + I)(θ − θ∗ρ). (20)
Define ∆(θ)2 := (θ−θ∗ρ)>(Σn+I)(θ−θ∗ρ). Because G,K ≥ 1, we have that (θ−θ∗ρ)>Σn(θ−θ∗ρ) ≥
∆(θ)2− 12‖θ−θ∗ρ‖22. Subsequently, combining Eqs. (17,20), we have with probability 1−O(T−2)
for all ‖θ‖2 ≤ 2 that
F̂n(θ)− F̂n(θ∗ρ) ≥
∆(θ)2
2GK
+
ρ− 1
2
‖θ − θ∗ρ‖22 − sG
√
3d lnT∆(θ)
= ∆(θ)
(
∆(θ)
2GK
− sG
√
3d lnT
)
+
ρ− 1
2
‖θ − θ∗ρ‖22. (21)
Now consider any θ such that ‖θ − θ∗ρ‖2 = 0.5. Because ‖θ∗ρ‖2 ≤ 1.5, we have ‖θ‖2 ≤ 2. We
will lower bound the right-hand side of Eq. (21) by a case analysis:
1. Case 1: ∆(θ) > 2sG2K
√
3d lnT . In this case, the first term in Eq. (21) is strictly positive
because ∆(θ) ≥ ‖θ − θ∗ρ‖2 ≥ 1/2. Therefore, F̂n(θ)− F̂n(θ∗ρ) > 0;
2. Case 2: ∆(θ) ≤ 2sG2K√3d lnT . In this case, because ρ ≥ 1, Eq. (21) can be simplified
to
F̂n(θ)− F̂n(θ∗ρ) ≥
ρ− 1
2
‖θ − θ∗ρ‖22 −∆(θ)× sG
√
3d lnT ≥ ρ− 1
2
1
4
− 6s2G2Kd lnT.
Under the condition ρ ≥ 2 + 48s2G2Kd lnT , the right-hand side of the above inequality is
strictly positive. Therefore, F̂n(θ)− F̂n(θ∗ρ) > 0.
Combining the above two cases, we have proved that with probability 1−O(T−2), for every
‖θ−θ∗ρ‖2 = 0.5, F̂n(θ)− F̂n(θ∗ρ) > 0. Since Fn is convex, this means that the global minimizer of
F̂n must be contained on the interior of {θ : ‖θ − θ∗ρ‖2 ≤ 0.5} ⊆ {θ : ‖θ‖2 ≤ 2}. This completes
the proof of Lemma 3.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 4
First, by Lemma 3 we know that with probability 1 − O(T−2), ‖θ̂pn‖2 < 2. The remainder of
this proof is conditioned on the event that ‖θ̂pn‖2 < 2.
Because ‖θ̂pn‖2 < 2, the constraints in the optimization problem
θ̂pn = arg min‖θ‖2≤2
L̂n(θ) +
ρ
2
‖θ‖22 + w>θ
33
are not active. Therefore, by first-order KKT conditions we have that
0 = ∇L̂n(θ̂pn) + ρθ̂pn + w =
∑
t<n
ζ(f(φ>t θ̂
p
n)− yt)φt + ρθ̂pn + w. (22)
Recall the definition that ξt = yt − f(φ>t θ∗). Re-arranging terms in Eq. (22) we obtain∑
t<n
(f(φ>t θ̂
p
n)− f(φ>t θ∗))φt =
∑
t<n
ξtφt − ζ−1(ρθ̂pn + w).
By the mean-value theorem, there exists θ˜ = θ∗ + λ(θ̂pn − θ∗) for some λ ∈ [0, 1] such that∑
t<n(f(φ
>
t θ̂
p
n)− f(φ>t θ∗))φt =
∑
t<n f
′(φ>t θ˜)(θ̂
p
n − θ∗)>φtφt. Subsequently,∑
t<n
f ′(φ>t θ˜)(θ̂
p
n − θ∗)>φtφ>t =
∑
t<n
ξtφ
>
t − ζ−1(ρ[θ̂pn]> + w>).
Multiplying both sides of the above equality by (θ̂pn − θ∗) and noting that ζ−1 ≤ G, ‖θ̂pn‖2 < 2,
we have
(θ̂pn − θ∗)>
[∑
t<n
f ′(φ>t θ˜)φtφ
>
t
]
(θ̂pn − θ∗) ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
t<n
ξtφ
>
t (θ̂
p
n − θ∗)
∣∣∣∣∣+G(2ρ+ ‖w‖2)‖θ̂pn − θ∗‖2.
Note that, because ‖θ∗‖2 ≤ 1 and ‖θ̂pn‖2 < 2, we have ‖θ˜‖2 ≤ 2. Subsequently, f ′(φ>t θ˜) ≥
K−1 for all t. Invoking also Lemma 10 and Eq. (15), we have with probability 1−O(T−2) that
1
K
(θ̂pn−θ∗)>Σn(θ̂pn−θ∗) ≤ s
√
3d lnT
√
(θ̂pn − θ∗)>Σn(θ̂pn − θ∗)+G(2ρ+νε,δ
√
5d lnT )‖θ̂pn−θ∗‖2.
For notational simplicity define ∆2ρ = (θ̂
p
n − θ∗)>Λn(θ̂pn − θ∗) where Λn = Σn + ρI. Because
‖θ∗‖2 ≤ 1, ‖θ̂pn‖2 < 2 we have ‖θ̂pn − θ∗‖2 ≤ 3. Subsequently,
∆2ρ ≤ sK
√
3d lnT∆ρ + [G(2ρ+ νε,δ
√
5d lnT ) + 3ρ]‖θ̂pn − θ∗‖2. (23)
Dividing both sides of Eq. (23) by ∆ρ and noting that ∆ρ ≥ √ρ‖θ̂pn−θ∗‖2 with ρ ≥ 1, we obtain
with probability 1−O(T−2) that
∆ρ ≤ sK
√
3d lnT + (2G+ 3)
√
ρ+Gνε,δ
√
5d lnT . (24)
The first inequality in Lemma 4 is thus proved.
We next prove the sharpened inequality with the additional condition that λmin(Σn) ≥
λ0 = [
(2G+3)ρ√
5d lnT
+ νε,δG]
2. With this condition, we have ∆ρ ≥
√
λ0 + ρ‖θ̂pn − θ∗‖2 ≥ [ (2G+3)ρ√5d lnT +
νε,δG]‖θ̂pn − θ∗‖2. Subsequently, dividing both sides of Eq. (23) by ∆ρ we obtain
∆ρ ≤ sK
√
3d lnT +
√
5d lnT ≤ 4sK
√
d lnT ,
which is to be demonstrated.
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C Proofs of technical lemmas in Sec. 6
C.1 Proof of Lemma 6
Because rn(p) ∈ [0, 1] and p ∈ [0, 1] almost surely, we only need to prove that |rn(p)− r̂n(p)| ≤
γ
√
φ(p, xn)>[Λp]−1φ(p, xn) for all n and p. Fix φ = φ(p, xn) for some p ∈ [0, 1]. Decompose
|f(φ>θ∗)− f(φ>θ̂p)| as
∣∣f(φ>θ∗)− f(φ>θ̂p)∣∣≤K∣∣φ>(θ̂p − θ∗)∣∣ ≤ K‖φ‖[Λp]−1‖θ̂p − θ∗‖Λp (25)
≤ K(sK
√
3d lnT + (2G+ 3)
√
ρ+Gνε′2,δ′2
√
5d lnT )×
√
φ>[Λp]−1φ (26)
≤ γ
√
φ>[Λp]−1φ. (27)
Here, the first inequality in Eq. (25) holds because ‖θ∗‖2 ≤ 1 and ‖θ̂pn‖2 < 2 with high prob-
ability, and therefore |f(φ>θ∗) − f(φ>θ̂p)| = |f ′(φ>θ˜)φ>(θ̂p − θ∗)| ≤ K|φ>(θ̂p − θ∗)| by the
mean value theorem. Eq. (26) holds with probability 1 − O(T−1) by invoking Lemma 4. This
completes the proof of Lemma 6.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 9
Because {pt} are chosen uniformly at random from [0, 1], it holds that E[ΣT0+1] =
∑
t≤T0 E[φtφ
>
t ] 
κxT0Id. On the other hand, because ‖φt‖2 ≤ 1 almost surely, by matrix Hoeffding’s inequality
(see, e.g., Theorem 1.3 of (Tropp 2012)) we have that with probability 1−O(T−1),
∥∥ΣT0+1 − E[ΣT0+1]∥∥op ≤√8T0 ln(dT ).
With T0 ≥ 32κ−2x ln(dT ), it holds with probability 1−O(T−1) that ‖ΣT0+1−E[ΣT0+1]‖op ≤ κx2 T0
and subsequently λmin(ΣT0+1) ≥ κx2 T0. Furthermore, with T0 ≥ 2κ−1x [ (2G+3)ρ√5d lnT + νε,δG]2, it
further holds that κx2 T0 ≥ [ (2G+3)ρ√5d lnT + νε,δG]2, satisfying the condition in Lemma 4.
The above analysis imposes the lower bound T0 ≥ max{32κ−2x ln(dT ), 2κ−1x [ (2G+3)ρ√5d lnT +νε,δG]2}
on T0. It is easy to verify that, with T ≥ eκ−2x , the condition T0 ≥ 32[ (2G+3)ρ√5d lnT + νε,δG]2 ln
2(dT )
implies T0 ≥ max{32κ−2x ln(dT ), 2κ−1x [ (2G+3)ρ√5d lnT + νε,δG]2}. This completes the proof of Lemma
9.
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